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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of the relaxation of the rigidity of employment
protection legislation in dual economies on qualification mismatch, measured as the sum
of over-education and under-education. Using a unique matched employer-employee
flow dataset, the effect of two reforms, which significantly modified the rules for the
utilisation of temporary contracts in Italy is studied. By increasing the relative flow
of workers on short-term contracts, the short-term contract reform is found to have
reduced the relative flow of over-educated workers. However, this result holds only
for older male workers, while no effect is found for female and younger workers. The
apprenticeship reform instead had no major effects on the relative flow of mismatched
workers.
Keywords: temporary contracts, labour market reforms, over-education, heterogeneous
effects.
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1 Introduction
Mismatched workers in OECD countries account for approximately 25 percent of the total
workforce (CEDEFOP 2014). Mismatch is particularly severe in Mediterranean countries,
which are characterized by more segmented labour markets (European Commission 2013). In
these “dual economies” (Saint-Paul 2002), labour market flexibility has been introduced at
the margin, with the creation of two tiers. In the upper tier, workers who are usually hired on
open-ended contracts characterized by stringent employment legislation (EPL), enjoy higher
wages and good benefits. In the lower tier workers are typically hired on low-EPL temporary
contracts and experience lower wages, higher turnover and job insecurity (Cahuc et al. 2016,
Dolado et al. 2002). In this context, the role of temporary contracts in affecting mismatch is
ambiguous. On one side, temporary contracts are used by new entrants in the labour market
as a stepping stone, while still searching for better matches (Groot 1996, Groot & Maassen
Van Den Brink 2000): the so-called “waiting room effect” (Dekker et al. 2002). Even though
data show that approximately 23% of UK graduates (McGuinness & Sloane 2011) and 20%
of Italian graduates (Iammarino & Marinelli 2015) at their first job experience are over-
educated, this is a temporary phenomenon, as the increased flexibility facilitates job-to-job
transitions and provides scope for improving the quality of the matches. On the other side,
temporary jobs serve as an instrument to integrate into the labour market weaker segments
of the populations, with lower productivity and bargaining power. These workers are more
willing to take up temporary jobs which demand lower qualifications than the ones they
possess, because they are happy to find a job after searching for a long time. Over-education
in this segment of the labour market is a more persistent phenomenon due to the assumed
“dead-end” character of these contracts, which may be strengthened by the stigmatization
of these workers (Dekker et al. 2002).
This paper investigates the way the reform of two types of temporary contracts in Italy
during the early 2000s affected qualification mismatch. The focus is on the Italian region
Veneto for a number of reasons. First, the implementation of several labour market reforms
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in Italy (1997, 2001 and 2003) reduced the average EPL strictness of temporary contracts
(Figure 1a). As a result, the share of temporary contracts increased significantly (Figure 1b).
Second, Italy is among the OECD countries with the highest rates of mismatch (Verhaest
& van der Velden 2013) and ranks number one for under-education (McGowan & Andrews
2015). Third, Veneto is one of the leading Italian industrial regional economies: in 2016,
the nominal GDP accounted for 9.25% of the Italian GDP, the GDP per capita was ap-
proximately equal to 111% of the EU average (European Commission 2019) and the highly
specialized manufacturing base (see Appendix) makes its economy comparable to the German
one (Devicienti et al. 2019).
To pursue this objective, the longitudinal dataset PLANET, which provides information
on the universe of workers’ flows in the private sector in Veneto, is merged with the AIDA
dataset, which provides firms’ balance sheets information. Due to its longitudinal feature,
the time period covered (1998-2011) and the detailed information on workers’ education and
occupation, the final dataset is unique.
Workers are defined as mismatched if their level of education is higher (or lower) com-
pared to the mode of workers in the same age group, within the same occupation who enter
the market in a specific year. A difference in differences model is proposed, in which two
institutional reforms occurred in 2001 and 2003 are analysed to study the way qualification
mismatch among temporary workers has changed after the reforms. The 2001 reform liberal-
ized the utilization of short-term contracts, but its actual implementation had to wait for the
approval of collective bargaining, which took place in different sectors at different times. The
2003 reform, which modified a number of features of the apprenticeship contract in terms
of eligibility, duration, minimum wage and training content, required regional governments
or industry-specific collective agreements to issue implementation guidelines, and therefore
the actual implementation happened in different regions and sectors at different times. The
identification strategy is borrowed from Cappellari et al. (2012), and the variation in the
implementation of the two reforms is exploited to identify their effects on workers’ mismatch.
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The results show that the short-term contract reform had a significant positive effect
on the relative flow of workers hired on short-term contracts, which lead to a significant
reduction of the relative flow of over-educated workers. These findings suggest that by
enabling workers to escape from relatively poor matches and by providing tools to firms
to substitute workers with different skills, the short-term contract reform has been effective
in improving the quality of the matches. However, these results are short-term and hold only
for older male workers, while there is no evidence of beneficial effects among women and
younger workers. Although the apprenticeship reform introduced multiple changes to the
regulations of the apprenticeship contract, which could have affected the flow of mismatched
workers, no significant effect is found neither in terms of over-education, nor in terms of
under-education.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the relationship
between EPL rigidity and mismatch, while Section 3 describes the Italian institutional back-
ground, while Section 4 illustrates the methodology. Section 5 describes the data, Section 6
explains the validity of the approach, and Section 7 illustrates the results. Finally, Section 8
concludes the paper.
2 Literature review
In the literature, there is no clear-cut evidence on the relationship between the rigidity of
EPL and mismatch. Di Pietro (2002) discusses a number of reasons why rigid markets with
stringent EPL are expected to be associated with higher mismatch. First, stringent EPL on
the firing of permanent workers makes it more difficult for firms to adapt their workforce to
shocks and to address gaps between the demand and supply of skills. Hence, less stringent
EPL reduces mismatch by decreasing the waiting time until workers get a better match.
Second, firing restrictions may prevent firms from immediately taking advantage of upward
changes in skilled workforce availability, discouraging them from adopting new technologies
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and reducing the number of vacancies that can be filled with high-skilled workers. Third, rigid
EPL tends to lock highly educated workers into relatively poor matches by making it more
difficult for them to obtain a new position, leading indirectly to a higher incidence of over-
education by pushing the economy towards a "low-skill, low-technology trap". In an influential
work, Lazear (1998) shows that when firms face barriers to laying off due to legal or other
institutional impediments (e.g., powerful trade unions), the relative value of risky workers,
whose productivity is unknown, is reduced, with negative effects on the average quality of
the workers. Brunello et al. (2007) also argue that as more rigid EPL makes it harder for
individuals to obtain their first job and for firms to reduce staff, the use of temporary contracts
may help reduce mismatch. Sicherman (1991) states that, under a strict EPL regime, firms
face longer employment relationships and, if experience complements education, employers
prefer to hire highly educated young workers without experience to allow for future internal
promotions, thus increasing the share of over-educated workers (Croce & Ghignoni 2012).
On a different perspective, Gangl (2004) claims that stringent EPL countries may experience
lower over-education because employers may be more risk-adverse in recruiting, with positive
effects on the quality of the matches.
Empirically, Ortiz (2010) finds a positive correlation between being hired on a temporary
contract and being over-educated. Daly et al. (2000), Verhaest & van der Velden (2013) and
Croce & Ghignoni (2012) fail to find a significant correlation between EPL and mismatch.
Davia et al. (2017) instead find that countries with more rigid EPL are associated with lower
shares of over-educated workers.
Another related strand of the literature focuses on the effect of minimum wage on em-
ployment (Dube et al. 2010, Neumark & Wascher 2008), specifically on teen employment
(Allegretto et al. 2017, Giuliano 2013, Manning 2016, Portugal & Cardoso 2006), which re-
mains a controversial topic among economists. Although there is no evidence of the direct
effect of minimum wage on qualification mismatch in the literature, by making the apprentice-
ship contract more expensive firms might become more selective when hiring an apprentice,
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which should lead to the recruitment of better educated workers. Nevertheless, when min-
imum wage is increased the retention rate of workers is higher (Portugal & Cardoso 2006),
and this might lead instead firms to select more under-educated workers, with the intent of
providing specific training (Berton et al. 2017).
3 Institutional background
The typical labour contract in Italy is the permanent contract, which is open-ended and
associated with stringent employment protection regulations (EPL). The short-term contract
shares all the features of the permanent contract except for the limited duration and zero firing
costs at termination. A short-term contract can only be renewed once and its total duration
cannot be longer than three years. When hiring a worker on a short-term contract, employers
need to justify why they offer a short-term instead of a permanent contract, choosing among
a list of specific circumstances, such as the replacement of workers on leave or a sudden
increase in production. If either the length or the motivation is not truly reported, the
worker can sue the employer to get her contract converted to a permanent one. Firms can
also use apprenticeship contracts to hire young workers for a maximum duration of four
years, and are required to provide on the job training to be performed by local authorities or
accredited training institutions. At the end of the training period, the acquired qualifications
are asserted by a formal certification. To compensate for the training costs incurred by the
firms, labour costs amount to one third of the costs paid for permanent and short-term
contracts.
In Italy and in the Veneto region, in 2014 permanent contracts accounted for approxi-
mately 87-88% of total employment, followed by short-term contracts (7-9%), while appren-
ticeship contracts accounted for approximately 1.5-2.5% of total employment.
In the time period considered (1998-2007) two major labour market reforms were imple-
mented: the short-term contract reform (Law 368/2001) and the apprenticeship reform (Law
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30/2003).
3.1 The short-term contract reform
The 2001 reform (Law 368/2001) introduced a major novelty in the short-term contract
regulation: the possibility to use the contract for any reason of a technical, organisational,
production or replacement nature, largely broadening the scope for utilization. Because of the
strong deregulation of the short-term contract, this reform was instrumental in establishing
a dual labour market (Boeri 2011).
The relaxation of this rule, however created confusion among employers regarding the
requirements for adoption (Aimo 2006): it was not clear whether employers could use short-
term contracts also for activities not of temporary nature. Moreover, in case of court disputes,
the applicability relied too much on the interpretations of the judges, causing delays and
high uncertainty on the potential outcome. The risk incurred by firms of being obliged
to convert short-term contracts in permanent contracts after a court appeal created strong
disincentives for their adoption (Venn 2009). According to the new legislation, collective
bargaining was responsible for setting the maximum percentage of fixed-term employees in
firms’ total employment. For this reason, to be effective in a given industry the new law had to
wait for the renewal of the specific collective agreements. In practice, all collective agreements
confirmed the maximum share of short-term contracts set in the previous bargaining rounds,
so no differences were introduced by the reform on employment flexibility across industries.
Nevertheless, only industries with contracts negotiated after the law was implemented
could utilize the new short-term contract. After 2001, the renegotiation of collective bar-
gaining agreements at sectoral level only occurred in some industries in 2005, 2006 and 2007
(Table 1). Few sectors of the economy, such as Metal Manufacturing and Banking renewed
the collective agreements during the period but postponed the implementation of the “new”
short-term contract to a later normative agreement, which took place after the period consid-
ered (See Appendix). This variation across sectors is exploited in the identification strategy.
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3.2 The apprenticeship reform
The 2003 reform (Law 30/2003) significantly modified a number of features of the appren-
ticeship contract, in terms of eligibility, duration, minimum wage and training content. First,
the limit for eligibility was raised from 25 to 29 years old; second, the duration of the contract
was extended from varying between eighteen months and four years (five in the craft sector)
to vary between two years and six years; third, a minimum wage at least two levels below the
wage of a similarly qualified worker (i.e., the position reached by the end of the contract) was
instituted, and finally, the option for firms to supply training at the workplace as a substitute
for external training was established (Albanese et al. 2017). While the latter was an attempt
to tackle the inefficiencies of local authorities, it also made it harder to monitor compliance.1
The national law was enacted in 2003 and it required regional governments to issue the
necessary regulations concerning the training content of the new apprenticeship contract. All
regions acted slowly, including Veneto, which issued the regulations in 2009. However, addi-
tional institutional variations in the adoption of the new apprenticeship contract were offered
by Law 80/2005, which provided that in the absence of regional regulations, industry-specific
collective agreements could define the rules for the training content of the apprenticeship
contract. Starting from 2005, collective agreements which enabled the utilization of the new
apprenticeship contract were signed in specific sectors (Table 2). This variation across sectors
is exploited in the identification strategy.
Data show that the share of apprentices among the 15-29 employed workers in the Veneto
region increased from 16.7% in 2005 to 19.9% in 2007. However, while 16.6% of apprentices
were in training in 2005, only 12.1% were in training in 2007. In addition, the average
duration range marginally increased compared to the period before the reform, with an
average minimum and maximum length across sectors of 33 and 56 months, respectively (See
Appendix).
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4 Methodology
The goal is to study the effect of the implementation of two labour market reforms which
significantly modified key features of temporary contracts on mismatch. An employed person
may experience two forms of mismatch: qualification and skills mismatch (See Appendix).
The focus here is on qualification mismatch, which refers to a situation in which a person
holds a job whose qualification requirements do not correspond to the level and/or type of
qualification she has (ILO 2018). In the literature three different measures of qualification
mismatch (Leuven & Oosterbeek 2011) have been proposed: objective (or normative), sub-
jective (self-assessed), and statistical (Hartog 2000). While the first approach is based on
classifications, which quickly become outdated (Chevalier 2003, ILO 2018), the second ap-
proach heavily relies on the opinion of the respondent and the wording of the survey question
(Alba-Ramirez 1993, Allen & van der Velden 2001, Chevalier & Lindley 2009, Mavromaras
et al. 2010). The statistical measure, which estimates the level of qualification mismatch by
comparing the level of education attained with the mean (Verdugo & Verdugo 1989) or the
modal (Bauer 2002, Kiker et al. 1997, Mendes de Oliveira et al. 2000) value of the level of ed-
ucation within each occupational category, is the one used in this study. The main reason for
selecting this approach is the availability of a unique employer-employee flow dataset, which
provides detailed information on firms and workers for the period of the reforms. The mode
is chosen (over the mean), like in most of the literature, (Battu & Sloane 2004, Chiswick &
Miller 2009, Kampelmann & Rycx 2012) as it is the measure least affected by the shape of
the distribution of education (Mavromaras et al. 2012). To take into account the dynamic
nature of the required education due to changes in technology and educational quality, cells
of individuals are defined according to age group, occupation and year of entrance in the
labour market (Quinn & Rubb 2006). Workers are mismatched if they are over- (under-)
educated, i.e., their level of education is higher (lower) compared to the mode of workers in
the same age group, within the same occupation who enter the market in a specific year.
This definition based on flows rather than on stocks allows to better capture the evolution of
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the required education for a specific type of job over time. Moreover, the focus on flows into
and out of temporary contracts (of limited duration) helps overcome the potential drawback
of this approach of having the occupational mode driven by the majority of incumbent older
workers with longer tenure.
The staggered implementation of the two labour market reforms gives rise to a quasi-
experimental setting in which adopting and non-adopting sectors within the Veneto region are
observed over a sufficient period of time. The identification strategy borrows from Cappellari
et al. (2012) and the model is specified as follows:
Yj,t = c+ α(SReform)j,t + β(AReform)j,t + γ(SAReform)j,t + ζt + φj + j,t (1)
where j refers to the firm and t to the time. Four groups of firms are identified: those
not affected by the reforms, those affected only by the first reform, those affected only by
the second reform and those affected by both reforms. (SReform)j,t is the dummy variable
which takes value one for firms with an active business in years and sectors affected only by
the short-term contract reform, (AReform)j,t is the dummy variable which takes value one for
firms with an active business in years and sectors affected only by the apprenticeship reform,
and (SAReform)j,t is the dummy which takes value one for firms with an active business in
years and sectors affected by both reforms.2 All estimates include year dummies, ζt, which
controls for shift in the dependent variable common to all sectors and firm fixed effects φj.
The coefficients of interest are α, β, and γ, which can be interpreted as the causal effects of
the short-term contract reform (α), the apprenticeship reform (β) and the combination of
both reforms (γ) on outcome Y . Data are collapsed at firm level and observations
are weighted by firm size; hence, per each firm one observation is retained in
each year considered. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered
at sector level (Cameron & Miller 2015).
Although, in the literature there is no clear theoretical insight about timing, the effect on
mismatch is expected to be contemporaneous to the reforms. Given that the workers flows
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are analysed and the implementation of the reforms had been already significantly delayed
(the laws were approved in 2001 and 2003, respectively), it is envisioned that firms would
react promptly to take advantage of the new rules.
As a first step, the flow of a specific category of workers X is defined as the difference
between the entries and the exits of those workers in firm j at time t, i.e., (Xentriesjt −Xexitsjt ).
Second, the effect of the two reforms on the contribution of the flow of each contract type to
the total employment flow in firm j at time t is computed to investigate whether each reform
contributed to increase proportionally more the utilization of specific types of contracts. To
do so, Equation 1 is estimated using as outcomes the ratio of the flows of short-term contracts
and apprenticeships and the total employment flow:
(St-rel)j,t = (Short-termflow)j,t/(Employmentflow)j,t (2)
(App-rel)j,t = (Apprenticesflow)j,t/(Employmentflow)j,t. (3)
Next, outcomes of interest such as total mismatch and its two components over- and
under-education, computed as the flow of workers in firm j at time t who are mismatched,
over-educated, and under-educated respectively, over the total employment flow are consid-
ered:
Mismatch-relj,t = (Mismatchedflow)j,t/(Employmentflow)j,t, (4)
Over-relj,t = (Over-educatedflow)j,t/(Employmentflow)j,t, (5)
Under-relj,t = (Under-educatedflow)j,t/(Employmentflow)j,t. (6)
Since in the literature specific groups of individuals are found to be more frequently
hired on temporary contracts and more exposed to mismatch (Dekker et al. 2002, Groot &
Maassen Van Den Brink 2000), potential asymmetric effects are explored. Accordingly, a
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triple difference-in differences estimation is performed, where an additional source of vari-
ation is included, by focusing on the relative flows of specific groups of workers within the
benchmark model (Equation 1). Specifically, gender and age represent a third dimension
along which the treatment varies (Goodman-Bacon 2018), as in the following model:
Yg,j,t = c+ α(SReform)j,t + β(AReform)j,t + γ(SAReform)j,t + δ(SReform)j,tG
+ λ(AReform)j,tG+ θ(SAReform)j,tG+ ζtG+G+ ζt + φj + j,t, (7)
where G refers to specific groups of workers, such as women and young individ-
uals in the age groups 15-24. Data are collapsed at firm level and category of
individuals. The interest is in the causal effects of the reforms for the group of workers g
on outcome Y , which are represented by the coefficients (α + δ) for the short-term contract
reform, (β+λ) for the apprenticeship reform and (γ+θ) for the combination of both reforms.
As workers eligible to be hired on an apprenticeship contract are those below the age of 29,
an additional analysis is performed by estimating model 1 on a restricted sample of firms
which hire workers in the age group 15-29.
5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
An employer-employee flow dataset from the Italian Veneto region (PLANET) is used to
perform the analysis. The dataset includes all workers who experienced a mobility episode,
i.e., hiring, firing, transformations, resignations, contract expiration and retirements. Once
entered in the panel each worker is followed for the entire career, unless she moves outside the
Veneto region.3 A valuable feature of this dataset is the inclusion of detailed information on
occupation (4 digits), education (8 categories), different types of labour contracts and firms’
characteristics, such as industry and sector (3 digits); however the stock of workers is not
observable. The firms’ national tax number (codice fiscale) is used to merge this dataset with
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the AIDA dataset, which provides balance sheets information inferred by the standardized
reports that firms file annually with the Chamber of Commerce.4 This dataset is used to
extract information on the firms size and the analysis is restricted to observations for which
the correlation between the flows of workers in AIDA and in PLANET is approximately 90%.
This matched employer-employee dataset provides all flows of workers into and out of firms
for the period 1998-2007.
Due to the poor reliability of the education level of foreign workers, firms whose average
flows of foreign workers during the period considered is above 4% (approximately 10% of
the firms) are removed from the sample. The tails of the flows distribution are cut below
1% and above 99% to avoid extreme values and occupations with less than 50 observations
are removed (approximately 0.004% of the total number of observations). The analysis is
focused on individuals between 15 and 64 years old.
In Figure 2 the evolution of the relative flows of temporary workers and qualification mis-
match is reported. An increase in the relative flow of short-term employees and apprentices is
observed in 2005, followed by a decline. While over-education increases in 2005 and decreases
afterwards, under-education decreases in 2005 and remains stable in 2006 and 2007.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the whole sample of workers and for the selected
sample. Characteristics such as age, education and qualification mismatch are quite similar
between the two groups. Approximately 50% of individuals in the sample have a junior-high
school degree and more than 30% have a high-school degree, with only 6% of individuals
having a tertiary level of education. Approximately 30% of workers are hired on a short-
term contract, while approximately 8% are hired on an apprenticeship contract. Short-term
contracts are more common among women (37% compared to 25%) and older workers. Over-
education affects 23% of the sampled individuals, mostly young males in the 15-24 and 25-34
age groups. Approximately 13% of the sampled workers are under-educated, mainly females
and older workers.
Two dummy variables which identify the treated and the control groups are created
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per each treatment/reform. Exposure to the treatment is defined based on the sector each
firm belongs. Treated firms with respect to the short-term contract reform are those firms
which operate in sectors whose collective agreements, signed after the implementation of
the 2001 law, passed the new legislation. In a similar fashion, treated firms with respect to
the apprenticeship reform are those firms which operate in sectors, whose industry-specific
collective agreements defined the rules for the training content of the apprenticeship contract.
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics of the firms included in the final sample. In Column
1, the characteristics of all firms are reported, in Column 2, the features of the subset of firms
not affected by the reforms are shown. In Columns 3 and 4, the characteristics of the subset of
firms, which were exposed to only one of the two reforms are reported, respectively. Finally,
Column 5 describes the characteristics of the subset of firms, which were exposed to both
reforms. No firms were subject to any treatment between 1998 and 2004, most firms exposed
to the first reform were treated in 2005, while most firms exposed to the apprenticeship reform
were treated in 2006. The characteristics of the firms are quite similar across groups, except
for a slightly lower employment flow and a slightly higher relative flow of short-term contracts
in firms exposed to the short-term contract reform. In terms of qualification mismatch, all
the variables reported are similar across groups.
6 Validity of this approach
The validity of this approach is based on three assumptions: first, the proposed measure of
mismatch is not endogenously affected by the reforms; second, the evolution of the outcomes
of interest in treated and control sectors would not be different without the reforms; and
finally, there is no casual relationship between the outcomes of interest and the adoption of
the reforms.
The proposed definition of mismatch relies on the mode of education being an accurate
measure of the education level within a certain occupation. In addition, being the mode
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a time-varying variable, it may be endogenously affected by the reforms. To rule out the
hypothesis that the reforms affected the mode (mean) of education and in turn had an
impact on the proposed measures of mismatch, Equation 1 is estimated using as outcomes
the mode and the mean of education computed at firm level (Table 5). The coefficients of the
reforms not significantly different from zero are interpreted as evidence that the labour market
reforms under consideration did not have an impact on the proposed measure of mismatch.
Additionally, a robustness analysis in which a 3-year lagged mode is used, with the advantage
of avoiding measuring the mode during a treatment period, thus ensuring exogeneity of the
treatment, provides results fully consistent with the findings obtained using the current mode
(see Appendix).
The validity of the Difference-in-Differences estimation strategy is also based on the as-
sumption that the evolution of the outcomes of interest for the adopting and non-adopting
sectors would not be systematically different in the absence of the intervention. The main
concern is indeed that sectors which adopted first the new contracts are those in which the
relative flows of temporary and mismatched workers were already growing faster, violating
the assumption of parallel trend before the treatment. To address this issue, the relative
flows of short-term workers, apprentices and mismatched workers in sectors affected and
non-affected by the short-term contract reform (Figure 3) and by the apprenticeship reform
(Figure 4) are compared. Panels 3a and 3b compare the relative flows of short-term workers
and apprentices in treated and control sectors with respect to the short-term contract reform.
Panel 3c depicts the relative flow of mismatch in adopting and non-adopting sectors, while,
panels 3d and 3e show the relative flows of over-educated and under-educated workers, re-
spectively. The same exercise is reported for firms in treated and control sectors with respect
to the apprenticeship reform (Figure 4). Although the figures reveal a similarity in the trends
of the two series before the reforms, formal placebo tests are provided. The main model is
estimated by including per each reform placebo dummies for the treated in the years before
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and after the reform, where k ∈ {S,A}:
Yj,t = c+
+2∑
p=−5
αp(kReform)j,t+p + ζt + φj + j,t.
Coefficients per each year per each outcome variable, together with the 95% confidence
intervals are reported in Figures 5-6. Although some coefficients turned out to be occasionally
different from zero in few years before the treatments, overall no systematic pattern of pre-
trend effects is found across all variables considered. We also observe a one-year anticipation
effect of the short-term contract reform on the relative share of short-term employees, which
could be ascribable to the firms and workers’ expectations of the industry collective agree-
ment renewals (Giannelli et al. 2012). Event studies for the triple difference in differences,
accounting for gender and age are reported in the Appendix.
Finally, to demonstrate the exogenous nature of the reforms, the dummies, which take
value one for the year in which the reforms were implemented and zero otherwise, where
k ∈ {S,A}, are regressed on the lags of the relative flows of temporary and mismatched
workers (Cappellari et al. 2012), as defined in Equations 2-3 and Equations 5-6, respectively:
k-Reformj,t = c+
5∑
q=1
St-relt−q + j,t, (8)
k-Reformj,t = c+
5∑
q=1
App-relt−q + j,t (9)
k-Reformj,t = c+
5∑
q=1
Over-relt−q + j,t, (10)
k-Reformj,t = c+
5∑
q=1
Under-relt−q + j,t. (11)
The employment flows are averaged across 3 digit sectors and provinces. If the coefficients
of the lag variables happen to be systematically statistically significant, this may reveal the
presence of a causal relationship between the relative flows of temporary and mismatched
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workers and the adoption of the reformed contracts. The results (Tables 6-7) show no sys-
tematic relationship between the lags of temporary employment and mismatch flows and the
adoption of the reforms, reassuring about the exogeneity of the reforms.
7 Results
7.1 General findings
The main findings are reported in Table 8. First, the effect of the reforms on the relative
flows of workers on temporary contracts (Columns 1-2 of Table 8), as defined in Equations
2-3 is shown. If the reforms promoted the utilization of certain types of temporary contracts
a change in the relative flow of workers hired on those contracts on the total employment flow
is expected. The relative contribution of short-term contracts to the total flow of employment
is found to be higher by approximately 5 percentage points due to the implementation of the
short-term contract reform, in line with the results of Cappellari et al. (2012).5 However, the
same reform had no effect on the relative flow of workers hired on apprenticeship. According
to the estimates, the apprenticeship reform had no significant effect neither on the relative
flow of short-term workers neither on the relative flow of apprentices. Also in firms exposed
to both reforms, which is an environment of high flexibility, the relative flow of temporary
workers (both short-term and apprentices) did not change. These results point to the fact that
the increased flexibility brought up by the short-term contract reform, through the extension
of the scope for hiring on a temporary basis, was positively received in the labour market.
As a consequence the relative flow of workers hired on short-term contracts increased, with
no substitution effects between apprenticeship and short-term contracts.
Then, the impact of the reforms on the relative flows of mismatched, over-educated and
under-educated workers (Columns 3-5 of Table 8), as defined in Equations 4-6 is analysed.
The short-term contract reform significantly decreased the relative flow of over-educated
workers by approximately 4.6 percentage points, while no effect was found with regards to
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under-education. In relation to the apprenticeship reform, no effect on the relative flows of
over-educated and under-educated workers is found. No effect is also found on the relative
flows of over-educated and under-educated workers in firms exposed to both reforms. These
findings suggest that by fostering the diffusion of short-term contracts, the short-term con-
tract reform was effective in significantly reducing the relative flow of over-educated workers.
This evidence supports the theory that lifting the restrictions in the utilization of short-term
contracts may facilitate the hiring decisions of firms, increase the number of vacancies, and
favour the firms’ adoption of new technologies, leading to better quality matches (Brunello
et al. 2007, Di Pietro 2002). A robustness test, in which the effect of the reforms is allowed
to be time-varying for each year after the implementation of the reform and in which a trend
variable and interacted time and treated group dummies for all the periods before and after
the treatments are added, confirms the main results. This test shows a significant effect
for the year of the treatment, informing about the simultaneous impact of the
reform. Although a significant coefficient on mismatch is observed also two years
after the reform, the corresponding coefficient on over-education is negative, but
not statistically significant. Overall, these results point to a robust short-term
effect of the reform, while persistence in the medium term is revealed to be weak
(Table 11 in the Appendix).
7.2 Heterogeneous effects
7.2.1 Males and females
Following recent research (Davia et al. 2017) which suggests that over-education is more
common among females as a consequence of the workers’ decisions to occupationally down-
grade in order to achieve an improved work-life balance, asymmetric effects by gender are
explored (Table 9). While the apprenticeship reform did not have any effect on the relative
flows of temporary and mismatched workers, independent on gender, interesting asymmetric
effects are found for the short-term contract reform. First, an increase in the relative flow of
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workers on short-term contracts ascribable to the short-term contract reform is observed only
among males, while no effect of the reform on the relative flows of temporary female workers
is found. Second, in terms of mismatch, the short-term contract reform significantly reduced
the relative flow of over-educated workers by 5.2 percentage points only among men, with
no effects among women. Hence, the increased flexibility brought by the short-term contract
reform was effective in improving the quality of the matches, but among male workers only.
As explained by Engellandt & Riphahn (2005), this may be due to the fact that women seek
temporary employment for different reasons compared to men. Women may more frequently
self-select in non-screening types of temporary employment compared to men because this
better matches their higher propensity to move on to non-market employment. Therefore,
this hypothesis could suggest that women in temporary employment ceteris paribus may
provide less effort than men, who are instead more likely to seek career advancement.
7.2.2 Young and older workers
Asymmetries among workers in the age group 15-24 (Table 10), which according to the
literature are disproportionately more likely to be hired on temporary contracts (García-
Pérez & Muñoz-Bullón 2011) are then explored. On average the relative flow of 15-24 young
workers hired on both short-term and apprenticeship contracts is higher by approximately
8.6 and 12.5 percentage points, compared to older workers. However, while the short-term
contract reform did not have any significant effect on the relative flows of 15-24 years old
workers hired on short-term or apprenticeship contracts, it increased the relative flow of older
workers hired on short-term contracts by 5.8 percentage points. There is weak evidence of
the apprenticeship reform reducing the relative flow of 15-24 years old workers hired on short-
term contracts by 7.6 percentage points, while increasing the same flow among older workers
by 4.2 percentage points. In firms exposed to both reforms, the relative flow of older workers
hired on short-term contracts decreased by approximately 5.6 percentage points, while no
effect was found for the 15-24 years old cohort.
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In terms of mismatch, the coefficients of the change in mismatch flows ascribable to the
reforms are all statistically insignificant for the 15-24 years old category. Nevertheless, the
relative flow of over-educated older workers is lower by 4.8 percentage points as a consequence
of the short-term contract reform, which confirms the general results reported in Table 8.
Our findings seem to suggest that the increased flexibility brought by the short-term contract
reform was beneficial for older workers in terms of reduced over-education, however younger
workers were not significantly affected. Hence, no evidence is found in support of the "wait-
ing room effect" hypothesis. Moreover, no evidence is found of increased over-education
imputable to the role of short-term contracts as an instrument to absorb weaker and older
segments of the working population (Dekker et al. 2002).
The changes to the legislation brought by the apprenticeship reform were multiple. In
fact, as a consequence of the reform workers are protected by a minimum wage, which has
been shown to reduce job turnover rates (Portugal & Cardoso 2006) and, by making the
apprenticeship contract more expensive, could have pushed firms to become more selective.
Moreover, the age eligibility extension could have also lead older workers (25-29 years old) to
be hired as apprentices, potentially increasing the relative flow of over-educated workers. To
further investigate these effects, an additional analysis is carried out by restricting the sample
to firms which hire only workers below the age of 29. Results show that the apprenticeship
contract reform did not have any significant effect neither on the relative flows of 15-29
workers on temporary contracts nor on the relative flows of 15-29 mismatched workers (Table
11). Moreover, when a triple difference-in-differences estimation is performed to isolate the
effects of the reforms on workers in the age category 15-24, all coefficients are statistically
insignificant (Table 12). Among the 25-29 age group, the apprenticeship reform increased
the relative flow of workers hired on short-term contracts, with no effects on mismatch. Also
in an environment of high flexibility, although the relative flow of 25-29 workers hired on
short-term contracts decreased, no effects are found on mismatch.
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8 Conclusions
In this paper new light is shed on the relationship between EPL rigidity and mismatch in
dual labour economies, by focusing on the impact of two labour market reforms approved
in Italy in the early 2000s, which significantly modified the rules for the utilization of short-
term and apprenticeship contracts. This research is important from a policy perspective as
it provides new insights on the role of temporary contracts in a domain which has been so far
little explored, such as qualification mismatch. The findings are mixed, as important positive
effects are found as a consequence of the short-term contract reform, but no effect is found
as a result of the apprenticeship contract. The lack of any effect of the latter is potentially
ascribable to the opposite direction of the amendments: while the age eligibility extension
and the increased opportunities for the provision of training increased the flexibility of the
contract, the introduction of a minimum wage added an additional restriction to the firms’
hiring decision. On the other hand, the short-term contract reform which clearly increased
the flexibility of the contract, lead to an improvement of the quality of the firm-worker
matches. The effect is found to be limited to older male workers, who have higher chances to
search for better jobs even when employed, increasing their likelihood to find a perfect match.
Women and younger workers, instead, who are the weakest segments of the population, were
not significantly affected by the enhanced labour market flexibility, potentially due to the
different rationale in their self-selection into temporary employment. This result comes
with the caveat of the effect being contemporaneous to the reform, with weak
evidence of persistence in the medium run.
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Notes
1The law also introduced two additional forms of apprenticeship. Students between the age of 15 and 18
can absolve their obligation in regular schools, by participating to full-time vocational courses, or through
apprenticeships (type I). In addition, the "high-apprenticeship" allows young individuals (age 18-29) to ob-
tain a secondary or tertiary level education degree (bachelor’s or master’s degree) through apprenticeship
(type III). The first type of apprenticeship was implemented in Veneto after 2007 (ISFOL 2009). The "high
apprenticeship" was experimentally implemented in Veneto in the same sectors in which the collective agree-
ments were renewed. Four Masters’ degrees were instituted, of which two terminated in 2007 and two in 2008
(ISFOL 2010). Due to the small number of apprentices involved (37 students), the focus is on the vocational
apprenticeship contract.
2The classification of treated and control sectors may be subject to a misclassification problem, as the
renewal of agreements has been implemented at micro-sector level and it is difficult to collect information
about all the collective agreements in the period considered. However, the classification of Cappellari et al.
(2012) and Albanese et al. (2017) is used, the identification strategy has been discussed with the authors and
the same sources have been used. The misclassification error should therefore be minimal and confined to a
limited number of observations.
3The size of the attrition is difficult to compute as workers who move away from Veneto are not observed
and the institution which provides the data does not release such information. However, using the admin-
istrative employer-employee Veneto Worker History dataset (Card et al. 2014), which covers the universe of
firms and workers in Veneto until 2001, the attrition rate is computed to be 3% in 1998-2001.
4These data are distributed by Bureau van Djik, and are available from 1995 onward for all corporate
(non-financial) firms with annual turnover above e500,000.
5A direct comparison with the results of Cappellari et al. (2012) is not possible: first, data representative
of a single Italian region are used, while their results are based on the Italian firms population; second, the
identification strategy used in this paper cannot take advantage of the variation in the implementation of the
apprenticeship reform at regional level; third, the definition of turnover in this paper is not computed using
the stocks of workers.
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Table 1. Short-term contract reform by year and sector.
Sector Year
Chemicals, Constructions, Food Products, Printing, 2005
Retail Trade, Textiles, Transportation, Wood Products
Energy, Telecommunication 2006
Real Estate, Water and Gas 2007
Note: The list refers to sectors/years in which the collective agreements
have been renewed and the rules for the new short-term contract approved.
Source: ISFOL (2010) and Consiglio Nazionale dell’Economia e del Lavoro
(CNEL).
Table 2. Apprenticeship reform by year and sector.
Sector Year
Banking 2005
Chemicals, Construction, Energy, Food Products, 2006
Metal Manufacturing, Printing, Retail Trade, Textiles,
Transportation, Wood products
Water and Gas, Rubber and Plastic, Tourism, Radio and TV 2007
Note: The listed sectors are the ones in which the specific collective
agreements have been renewed and the new apprenticeship contract
has been regulated. Source: ISFOL (2010) and ISFOL (2007).
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics - Workers.
Selected sample Whole sample
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Female 0.363 0.481 0.407 0.491
Age 15-24 0.303 0.460 0.285 0.452
Age 25-34 0.362 0.480 0.366 0.482
Age 35-44 0.209 0.407 0.217 0.412
Age 45-54 0.097 0.296 0.102 0.302
Age 55-64 0.028 0.165 0.029 0.168
No education 0.042 0.201 0.048 0.215
Elementary 0.067 0.250 0.075 0.263
Junior-high school 0.509 0.499 0.507 0.491
High-school 0.319 0.466 0.304 0.460
Bachelor’s degree 0.060 0.237 0.062 0.241
Post-graduate degree 0.003 0.051 0.003 0.052
PhD 0.0002 0.013 0.0002 0.014
Short-term 0.297 0.457 0.342 0.472
Short-term (female) 0.372 0.483 0.410 0.491
Short-term (male) 0.255 0.436 0.287 0.452
Short-term (Age 15-24) 0.230 0.421 0.276 0.447
Short-term (Age 25-34) 0.285 0.451 0.319 0.466
Short-term (Age 35-44) 0.328 0.469 0.369 0.482
Short-term (Age 45-54) 0.419 0.494 0.447 0.497
Short-term (Age 55-64) 0.521 0.499 0.549 0.497
Apprenticeship 0.080 0.271 0.063 0.242
Apprenticeship (female) 0.071 0.256 0.055 0.228
Apprenticeship (male) 0.085 0.279 0.067 0.251
Apprenticeship (Age 15-24) 0.252 0.433 0.209 0.407
Apprenticeship (Age 25-34) 0.010 0.097 0.007 0.087
Over-education 0.237 0.426 0.248 0.432
Over-education (female) 0.21 0.415 0.235 0.424
Over-education (male) 0.248 0.431 0.259 0.438
Over-education (Age 15-24) 0.266 0.442 0.282 0.450
Over-education (Age 25-34) 0.258 0.437 0.272 0.445
Over-education (Age 35-44) 0.168 0.374 0.169 0.374
Over-education (Age 45-54) 0.200 0.400 0.218 0.413
Over-education (Age 55-64) 0.222 0.416 0.233 0.423
Under-education 0.132 0.339 0.132 0.339
Under-education (female) 0.143 0.350 0.140 0.347
Under-education (male) 0.125 0.332 0.125 0.331
Under-education (Age 15-24) 0.102 0.302 0.106 0.308
Under-education (Age 25-34) 0.116 0.321 0.115 0.319
Under-education (Age 35-44) 0.158 0.365 0.156 0.362
Under-education (Age 45-54) 0.233 0.423 0.227 0.418
Under-education (Age 55-64) 0.166 0.372 0.145 0.351
No. of observations 614,204 1,731,679
No. of firms 12,823 16,563
Note: Whole sample: all workers, entering and exiting the firms in the
merged AIDA-PLANET dataset. Selected sample: all workers, entering
and exiting the selected firms in the final dataset, where the focus is on
the age range 16-64, firms whose average flows of foreign workers during
the period considered is above 4% are removed, the tails of the flows
distribution below 1% and above 99% are cut and occupations with less
than 50 observations are removed.
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics - Firms.
Full sample Never treated Short-term Apprenticeship Both reforms
No. of firms 12,823 5,314 355 1,914 5,240
Observations 59,259 45,270 1,950 3,206 8,833
1998 4,758 4,758 0 0 0
1999 5,167 5,167 0 0 0
2000 5,694 5,694 0 0 0
2001 5,405 5,405 0 0 0
2002 7,151 7,151 0 0 0
2003 6,702 6,702 0 0 0
2004 5,794 5,794 0 0 0
2005 6,188 2,522 1,943 112 1,611
2006 6,283 1,180 3 1,461 3,639
2007 6,117 897 4 1,633 3,583
Agriculture 0.87 1.14 0 0 0
Extraction 0.33 0.44 0 0 0
Manufacturing 48.49 49.50 59.85 88.90 26.15
Energy 0.12 0.14 0 0.12 0.07
Construction 7.51 6.66 24.67 0 10.81
Commerce 27.50 25.16 0 0 55.55
Hotels and Restaurants 1.71 1.50 0 10.39 0
Transport and Commun. 4.23 3.71 14.62 0 6.16
Finance 0.33 0.39 0 0.59 0
Real estate 6.45 8.27 0 0 0.89
Public sector 0.02 0.02 0 0 0
Education 0.21 0.27 0 0 0
Health 0.72 0.94 0 0 0
Others 1.51 1.86 0.87 0 0.36
Firm size 30.86 34.87 43.63 53.32 32.21
Employment flow 2.59 2.81 1.58 2.65 1.75
Share of short-term flow 0.13 0.12 0.19 0.17 0.17
Share of apprenticeship flow 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08
Share of mismatch flow 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.30
Share of over-education flow 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.17
Share of under-education flow 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.13
Note: Characteristics of firms according to different samples: Column 1 refers to all firms in the sample; Column 2
refers to firms never affected by the reforms (collective agreements not renewed); Column 3 refers to firms affected
only by the short-term contract reform (collective agreements only approved the new short-term contract);
Column 4 refers to firms affected only by the apprenticeship reform (collective agreements only approved
the new apprenticeship contract); Column 5 refers to firms affected by both reforms (collective agreements approved
both new contracts).
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Table 5. Effect of the reforms
on mean and mode levels of
education.
Mean Mode
SReform 0.0089 -0.0225
(1.06) (-1.14)
AReform -0.0120 -0.0098
(-1.04) (-0.64)
SAReform 0.0050 0.0147
(0.53) (0.67)
N 59259 59259
R2 0.0065 0.0033
Note: t statistics in parentheses;
Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The
dependent variables are: in
Column 1, the mean of education by
occupation and age at firm level,
in Column 2, the mode of education
by occupation and age at firm level.
Table 6. Trends in temporary employment.
SReform AReform SReform AReform
short-term t-1 0.102 0.089 apprenticeship t-1 0.139 0.151
(0.70) (0.60) (0.47) (0.51)
short-term t-2 0.03 -0.004 apprenticeship t-2 -0.303 -0.323
(0.01) (-0.02) (-1.09) (-1.19)
short-term t-3 0.017 0.023 apprenticeship t-3 -0.128 -0.155
(0.08) (0.11) (-0.42) (-0.50)
short-term t-4 0.243 0.208 apprenticeship t-4 0.012 -0.028
(1.21) (1.02) (0.04) (-0.10)
short-term t-5 -0.265 -0.247 apprenticeship t-5 0.384 0.367
(-1.10) (-1.01) (1.09) (1.05)
Constant 0.716∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗ Constant 0.729∗∗∗ 0.733∗∗∗
(9.85) (9.83) (12.24) (12.31)
N 1,737 1,737 N 1,737 1,737
R2 0.0234 0.0199 R2 0.0303 0.0325
Note: t statistics in parentheses, Significance levels:∗ p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The dependent variable takes value one in the year of the reform and zero otherwise.
Table 7. Trends in over-education and under-education.
SReform AReform SReform AReform
over-education t-1 0.300 0.308 under-education t-1 -0.196 -0.187
(0.98) (1.01) (-0.72) (-0.69)
over-education t-2 0.064 0.019 under-education t-2 0.019 0.034
(0.19) (0.06) (0.09) (0.15)
over-education t-3 0.160 0.162 under-education t-3 0.301 0.293
(0.72) (0.73) (1.21) (1.18)
over-education t-4 -0.073 -0.062 under-education t-4 -0.583∗ -0.572∗
(-0.40) (-0.34) (-1.85) (-1.80)
over-education t-5 -0.091 -0.072 under-education t-5 -0.284 -0.313∗
(-0.38) (-0.30) (-0.88) (-0.97)
Constant 0.769∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗ Constant 0.798∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗
(8.17) (8.10) (10.38) (10.32)
N 1,737 1,737 N 1,737 1,737
R2 0.0232 0.0218 R2 0.0375 0.0367
Note: t statistics in parentheses, Significance levels:∗ p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The dependent variable takes value one in the year of the reform and zero otherwise.
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Table 8. Relative employment and mismatch flows.
Short-term Apprenticeship Mismatch Over-education Under-education
SReform 0.0497∗∗ 0.0023 −0.0573∗∗∗ −0.0464∗∗∗ -0.0108
(2.12) (0.22) (-3.12) (-2.71) (-0.70)
AReform 0.0188 -0.0028 0.0192 -0.0002 0.0192
(0.90) (-0.30) (1.28) (-0.00) (1.40)
SAReform -0.0307 -0.0029 0.0222 0.0263 -0.0041
(-1.11) (-0.27) (1.16) (1.37) (-0.23)
Constant 0.1163∗∗∗ 0.0495∗∗∗ 0.3031∗∗∗ 0.1962∗∗∗ 0.1069∗∗∗
(6.06) (8.00) (24.03) (13.23) (7.98)
N 59259 59259 59259 59259 59259
R2 0.0026 0.0026 0.0008 0.0013 0.0008
Note: t statistics in parentheses; Significance levels:∗ p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The dependent
variable is computed as the net flow of workers over the net employment flow. All regressions include time
and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at sector level. Regressions are weighted by firm size.
Table 9. Relative employment and mismatch flows by gender.
Short-term Apprenticeship Mismatch Over-education Under-education
SReform 0.0754∗∗ 0.0088 −0.0801∗∗∗ −0.0525∗∗∗ −0.0276
(2.34) (0.59) (-3.23) (-2.52) (-1.42)
AReform -0.0089 -0.0029 -0.0015 -0.0159 0.0143
(-0.33) (-0.29) (-0.05) (-0.49) (0.94)
SAReform -0.0380 −0.0159 0.0493∗ 0.0354 0.0138
( -0.96) (-1.15) (1.82) (1.48) (0.65)
Female 0.0377 -0.0306 −0.0441 −0.0448 0.0006
(0.89) (1.54) (-0.82) (-0.89) (0.03)
SReform Female -0.0854 0.0729 0.0535 0.0302 0.0540
(-1.29) (-0.52) (1.38) (0.42) (1.55)
AReform Female 0.0722 −0.0580 0.0795 0.0548 0.0246
(1.35) (-0.31) (1.30) (0.89) (0.62)
SAReform Female 0.0288 0.0427 −0.1048∗ −0.0395 -0.0653
(0.36) (1.33) (-1.79) (-0.70) (-1.29)
Constant 0.1183∗∗∗ 0.0527∗∗∗ 0.3191∗∗∗ 0.2094∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(5.03) (6.36) (22.08) (14.64) (10.34)
N 59259 59259 59259 59259 59259
R2 0.0108 0.0029 0.0006 0.0016 0.0001
SReform Female (α+ δ) -0.0099 -0.0063 -0.0072 -0.0336 0.0264
(-0.20) (-0.29) (-0.18) (-0.93) (0.95)
AReform Female (β + λ) 0.0632 -0.0087 0.0779 0.0389 0.0390
(1.51) (-0.50) (1.65) (0.95) (1.11)
SAReform Female (γ + θ) -0.0092 0.0267 -0.0554 -0.0040 -0.0514
(-0.16) (1.03) (-1.12) (-0.09) (-1.19)
Note: t statistics in parentheses; Significance levels:∗ p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The dependent variable is computed
as the net flow of workers over the net employment flow. All regressions include time and firm fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at sector level. Regressions are weighted by firm size. The last three rows report the coefficients and t-statistics
for the group of female workers.
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Table 10. Relative employment and mismatch flows by age groups (15-24).
Short-term Apprenticeship Mismatch Over-education Under-education
SReform 0.0589∗∗ 0.0068 −0.0574∗∗ −0.0488∗∗ -0.0085
(2.11) (0.50) (-2.39) (-2.27) (-0.49)
AReform 0.0420∗ 0.0040 0.0099 −0.0084 0.0183
(1.65) (0.35) (0.60) (-0.33) (1.21)
SAReform −0.0565∗ −0.0190 0.0277 0.0304 -0.0027
(-1.78) (-1.35) (1.30) (1.31) (-0.13)
Age 15-24 0.0868∗ 0.1248∗∗∗ −0.0376 −0.0490 0.0167
(1.64) (5.26) (-1.31) (-1.04) (0.53)
SReform Age 15-24 −0.0521 0.0170 0.0210 0.0798 -0.0100
(-1.00) (0.58) (0.48) (0.73) (-0.29)
AReform Age 15-24 −0.1186∗∗ −0.0062 0.0387 0.0395 −0.0008
(-2.21) (-0.25) (0.94) (0.70) (-0.03)
SAReform Age 15-24 0.1327∗∗ 0.0202 −0.0434 −0.0381 −0.0053
(2.34) (0.55) (-0.86) (-0.66) (-0.13)
Constant 0.0612∗∗∗ −0.0398∗∗∗ 0.3100∗∗∗ 0.1585∗∗∗ 0.1044∗∗∗
(4.46) (-5.49) (21.22) (14.49) (7.67)
N 59259 59259 59259 59259 59259
R2 0.0085 0.1811 0.0016 0.0034 0.0011
SReform Age 15-24 (α+ δ) 0.0067 0.0239 -0.0363 -0.0177 -0.0185
(0.16) (1.00) (-1.04) (-0.55) (-0.62)
AReform Age 15-24 (β + λ) -0.0765∗ -0.0022 0.0486 0.0311 0.0174
(-1.74) (-0.11) (1.35) (0.70) (0.62)
SAReform Age 15-24 (γ + θ) 0.0762 0.0012 -0.0156 -0.0076 -0.0080
(1.53) (0.04) (-0.37) (-0.16) (-0.23)
Note: t statistics in parentheses; Significance levels:∗ p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The dependent variable is computed
as the net flow of workers over the net employment flow. All regressions include time and firm fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at sector level. Regressions are weighted by firm size. The last three rows report the coefficients and t-statistics
for the group of workers in the age group 15-24.
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Table 11. Relative employment and mismatch flows (sample of firms hiring workers in the age
range 15-29).
Short-term Apprenticeship Mismatch Over-education Under-education
SReform 0.0364∗∗ 0.0024 −0.0176 −0.0159 -0.0017
(1.98) (0.21) (-0.17) (-1.02) (-0.02 )
AReform 0.0234 -0.0045 0.0730 0.0220 0.0510
(1.44) (-0.44) (0.86) (1.25) (0.64)
SAReform −0.0426∗ −0.0035 -0.0067 0.0057 -0.0730
(-1.88) (-0.30) (-0.65) (0.30) (-0.74)
Constant 0.0281∗∗∗ −0.0440∗∗∗ −0.0510∗∗∗ 0.1001∗∗∗ −0.1512∗∗∗
(4.14) (6.50) (-1.50) (12.38) (-5.03)
N 48280 48280 48280 48280 48280
R2 0.0012 0.0028 0.0003 0.0015 0.0004
Note: t statistics in parentheses; Significance levels:∗ p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The dependent
variable is computed as the net flow of workers over the net employment flow. The sample includes all firms
which hire workers with age below 29. All regressions include time and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at sector level. Regressions are weighted by firm size.
Table 12. Relative employment and mismatch flows by age groups (sample of firms hiring
workers in the age range 15-29).
Short-term Apprenticeship Mismatch Over-education Under-education
SReform 0.0787 0.0093 0.0434 −0.0003 0.0437
(1.62) (0.62) (0.34) (-0.02) (0.34)
AReform 0.0431∗∗ 0.0030 0.0513 0.0318 0.0195
(2.21) (0.26) (0.74) (1.56) (0.30)
SAReform −0.0712∗∗ −0.0221 −0.0758 −0.0162 -0.0596
(-2.48) (-1.44) (-0.64) (-0.74) (-0.52)
Age 15-24 0.0787∗∗∗ 0.2525∗∗∗ 0.1765∗∗∗ 0.0948∗∗∗ 0.0817
(3.13) (13.30) (2.54) (4.79) (1.18)
SReform Age 15-24 −0.0070 0.0093 −0.2120 −0.0362 -0.1758
(-0.12) (0.31) (-1.01) (-0.82) (-0.87)
AReform Age 15-24 −0.0907∗∗ −0.0093 0.1188 −0.0412 0.1600
(-2.09) (-0.37) (0.59) (-0.89) (0.85)
SAReform Age 15-24 0.1014 0.0274 −0.0492 0.0578 −0.1070
(1.47) (0.74) (-0.19) (1.11) (-0.43)
Constant −0.0050 −0.0274∗∗∗ −0.1883∗∗∗ 0.0624∗∗∗ −0.2508∗∗∗
(-0.49) (-5.48) (-3.51) (5.98) (-5.08)
N 48280 48280 48280 48280 48280
R2 0.0141 0.1728 0.0080 0.0320 0.0029
SReform Age 15-24 (α+ δ) 0.0353 0.0186 −0.1686 −0.0365 -0.1321
(0.84) (0.79) (-1.04) (-1.05) (-0.86)
AReform Age 15-24 (β + λ) −0.0476 −0.0063 0.1701 −0.0093 0.1795
(-1.29) (-0.30) (0.79) (-0.24) (0.88)
SAReform Age 15-24 (γ + θ) 0.0302 0.0053 −0.1250 0.0416 −0.1666
(0.54) (0.18) (-0.54) (0.94) (-0.77)
Note: t statistics in parentheses; Significance levels:∗ p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The dependent variable is computed
as the net flow of workers over the net employment flow. The sample includes all firms which hire workers with age below 29.
All regressions include time and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at sector level. Regressions are weighted by
firm size. The last three rows report the coefficients and t-statistics for the group of workers in the age group 15-24.
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Figure 1. EPL index associated with temporary contracts and share of temporary employees. Source:
OECD.
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Figure 2. Relative employment and mismatch flows (1998-2007).
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Note: The variables are defined as in Equations 2-6 and weighted by firm size.
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Figure 3. Relative short-term workers and apprenticeship workers flows and relative over-educated and
under-educated workers flows in Treated and Control groups with respect to the short-term contract reform.
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Note: Each variable is computed as the ratio with respect to the employment flow, as defined in Equations 2-6. The treated
group includes all firms in sectors in which the collective agreements have approved the rules for the new short-term contract.
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Figure 4. Relative short-term workers and apprenticeship workers flows and relative over-educated and
under-educated workers flows in Treated and Control groups with respect to the apprenticeship reform.
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Note: Each variable is computed as the ratio with respect to the employment flow, as defined in Equations 2-6. The treated
group includes all firms in sectors in which the collective agreements have approved the rules for the new apprenticeship contract.
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Figure 5. Event study for the short-term contract reform.
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Note: The dependent variable is the net flow of workers over the net employment flow. All regressions include time and firm
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at sector level. Regressions are weighted by firm size. 95% confidence intervals are
reported.
Figure 6. Event study for the apprenticeship reform.
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Note: The dependent variable is the net flow of workers over the net employment flow. All regressions include time and firm
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at sector level. Regressions are weighted by firm size. 95% confidence intervals are
reported.
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